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Abstract—With the ubiquitous diffusion of social networks,
images are becoming a dominant and powerful communication
channel. Not surprisingly, they are also increasingly subject to
manipulations aimed at distorting information and spreading
fake news. In recent years, the scientific community has devoted
major efforts to contrast this menace, and many image forgery
detectors have been proposed. Currently, due to the success of
deep learning in many multimedia processing tasks, there is
high interest towards CNN-based detectors, and early results
are already very promising. Recent studies in computer vision,
however, have shown CNNs to be highly vulnerable to adversarial
attacks, small perturbations of the input data which drive
the network towards erroneous classification. In this paper we
analyze the vulnerability of CNN-based image forensics methods
to adversarial attacks, considering several detectors and several
types of attack, and testing performance on a wide range of
common manipulations, both easily and hardly detectable.
Index Terms—Image counterforensics, convolutional neural
networks, generative adversarial networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of social networks, images have become a dom-
inant communication vehicle. They convey information with
higher immediacy and depth than text, and have the potential
to elicit strong responses in the observers. Unfortunately,
with modern media editing tools, tampering with images has
become very easy. The manipulated images can be used to
discredit people, direct public opinion, even change the course
of political events, and pass easily unnoticed from ordinary
people.
A number of multimedia forensic tools have been proposed
in the last years to detect image manipulations [1]. In particu-
lar, methods based on high-order statistics of image residuals
have drawn great attention since long time [2], [3]. Indeed,
when a pristine image is modified, by inserting or removing
objects, or modifying global characteristics, several low-level
operations are usually involved, like linear or non-linear fil-
tering, resizing, or compression. All these operations leave
subtle but distinctive traces in the image micro-patterns, which
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can be discovered by means of suitable image descriptors
extracted from the high-pass image residual. To this end, the
SPAM (subtractive pixel adjacency matrix) features [4] and
the SRM (spatial rich models) [5] have shown great potential
for many image forensics tasks [6]–[8]. In particular, excellent
results [6], [8], [9] can be obtained even by considering one
specific single model from [5], the one computing 4-pixel co-
occurrences on the residuals of 3rd order linear filter. Given
their similarity wirh SPAM features, here for the sake of
brevity we will refer to them as S3SPAM or simply SPAM
features.
Nonetheless, the current trend in forensics, and in multime-
dia processing in general, is to abandon handcrafted features
in favor of deep learning. Given a sufficiently large training
set, deep nets, typically convolutional neural networks (CNN),
learn from the data which features best address the given task,
reaching usually impressive performance. The first CNN-based
detector of image manipulation was proposed in [10], inspired
to previous work in steganalysis. Its main peculiarity is an
ad hoc first layer, comprising a bank of filters constrained to
extract high-pass features. Since the most relevant information
for discrimination is hidden in the high-pass image content,
such filters speed up convergence to a satisfactory solution.
In [11], instead, it was proven that S3SPAM features can be
extracted by a simple shallow CNN. Besides reproducing the
very good results of the original detector, the resulting net
can be further improved by fine tuning on a specific dataset,
providing a very good performance even with a small training
set. Very recently, another deep learning solution has been
proposed, aimed at detecting the processing history of JPEG
images [12].
All the above networks, though very effective, are relatively
shallow. Very deep architectures can be expected to provide a
further performance boost. Tellingly, in a recent competition
on camera model identification organized by the IEEE Signal
Processing society on the Kaggle platform1, all top-ranking
teams proposed solutions based on an ensemble of very
deep networks. Likewise, very deep networks have shown top
performance and higher robustness [13] in detecting images
manipulated by generative adversarial networks (GAN).
Although deep learning holds great potential for multimedia
forensics, one should not rely on a safe environment, counting
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/sp-society-camera-model-identification
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Fig. 1. Our reference scenario. The subtle traces left during image forgery can be detected by a forensic tool (red cross in the bottom box). However, an
attacker can conceal such traces by injecting suitable adversarial noise, thus misleading the detector into authenticating the image as pristine (green checkmark).
on the attacker’s naivete. On the contrary, the risks incurred by
counter-forensic actions, aimed at neutralizing forensic tools
(see Fig.1), must be taken into serious account and analyzed
in depth. Some recent papers [14], [15], for example, propose
to attack SPAM-based detectors by means of iterative gradi-
ent descent algorithms, which prove very effective, although
definitely slow. Attacking CNNs, however, has proven to be
much simpler [16]. By exploiting the intrinsic differentiability
of the loss function, a suitable adversarial noise can be easily
generated and added to the input image to modify the network
decision, without visible image impairments. Following this
seminal paper, many more attacks based on adversarial noise
have been devised. In addition, deep learning can be used itself
for counter-forensics. In [17], a GAN-based architecture was
proposed to conceal the traces of 3×3 median filtering. Such
a study, though limited to a very special case, opens the way
to interesting developments.
Here, we investigate on the effectiveness of adversarial
attacks to CNN-based detectors. We consider a large set of
manipulations, both easily detectable and more challenging,
and several CNN-based detectors. Specific adversarial noise is
generated for each detector, and the effects are assessed both
on the target detector and on non-target ones. The performance
of GAN-based restoration is also assessed, with reference to
the especially challenging case of median filtering. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study on this topic.
In the rest of the paper, we describe the detectors (Section
2), the attacks (Section 3), and the experimental analysis
(Section 4), before drawing conclusions (Section 5).
II. CNN-BASED DETECTORS OF IMAGE MANIPULATION
In this Section we briefly recall some relevant CNN-based
detectors, with their main features. However we also consider
a baseline conventional detector, using handcrafted features [5]
and support vector machine (SVM) classification.
A. SPAM+SVM
To extract the residual features proposed in [5] the original
image is high-pass filtered and quantized with a small number
of bins. Then, co-occurrences are computed, encoded, and
collected in a linear histogram feature, normalized to unit
energy. Depending on the specific parameters of this process,
different features are obtained, collectively called rich models
[5]. As said before, we consider one single model here,
with third-order linear filter, 5-bin quantization, and 4-lag
co-occurrences (s3 spam14hv) and will refer to it as SPAM
features from now on.
B. Bayar2016
In [10] a relatively small CNN is proposed for image
manipulation detection, referred to as Bayar2016 from now
on, comprising three convolutional layers, two max-pooling
layers, and three fully-connected layers. In order to imme-
diately extract residual-based features, as suggested by the
literature, filters of the first layer, with 5×5 receptive field,
are constrained to respect the following rule{
w(0, 0) = −1∑
l,m6=0 w(l,m) = 1
(1)
Therefore, the sum of all weights is 0, enforcing the high-
pass nature of the filters. In particular, the off-center pixels
are combined to compute a prediction of the center pixel, so
the output of the filter can be regarded as a prediction error.
C. Cozzolino2017
The main result of [11] is that a large class of conventional
features can be computed exactly by suitable convolutional
networks. Although the result is quite general, the work
focuses on the SPAM feature described before. Exact SPAM
feature extraction requires only two convolutional layers,
followed by hardmax and average pooling. The extracted
features could then be used to train an external SVM. How-
ever, a full-fledged CNN-based detector is also built in [11],
by complementing the feature extractor subnet with a fully
connected layer which replaces the external SVM classifier.
Then, the hardmax is also replaced by softmax to ensure
differentiability, allowing further training by backpropagation.
Besides the theoretical result, the CNN proposed in [11] can
faithfully replicate the SPAM-SVM suite, and improve upon it
by means of quick fine tuning over a very small training set.
This latter version, referred to as Cozzolino2017, is considered
here.
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Fig. 2. Attacks in the feature space. Left: restoring the feature of the pristine
image. Right: crossing the decision boundary of the target detector. The second
attack is simpler but may fail with non-target detectors.
D. Very deep nets: Xception
In recent years, a large experimental evidence has accu-
mulated showing that network depth plays a fundamental
role for generalization ability. State-of-the-art architectures in
computer vision and related fields, such as ResNet, DenseNet,
InceptionNet, XceptionNet, all comprise from several dozens
to hundreds of layers. Our own experience in forensic ap-
plications [13] confirms the superior robustness of deep nets
to challenging and off-training conditions. On the down side,
deep nets require very large datasets for correct training, a
condition not always met in practice.
To include a deeper net in our comparative assessment we
selected Xception [18], comprising a total of 42 layers, 36
convolutional, 5 pooling, and one fully connected. Its main
architectural innovation is the use of separable filters. That is,
3D convolutions are obtained by the cascade of 2D spatial
and 1D cross-map convolutions. Thanks to this constraint, the
number of free parameters drops significantly w.r.t. competing
nets or, under a different point of view, a deeper architecture
can be adopted for the same level of complexity, allowing the
use of such a deep net even with a relatively small training
set.
III. ATTACKING FORENSIC DETECTORS
In this Section, we describe some possible strategies to
attack image forensic detectors, in particular
• gradient descent algorithms for SPAM+SVM;
• generation of adversarial noise for CNN-based detectors;
• GAN-based restoration of manipulated images.
Although we focus on targeted attacks, designed against a
specific detector, universal counter-forensic methods are also
studied, e.g., [19]
A. Attacking a SPAM-based detector by gradient descent
Let Xprist and X0 be the pristine and manipulated images,
with fprist and f0 the corresponding feature vectors, SPAM
in our case. Lacking perfect knowledge on the classifier, the
attacker wants to modify X0 into a new image, Xˆ , similar
to X0, to limit distortion, but whose feature, fˆ , is so close
to fprist to fool the detector, see Fig.2(left). In formulas, the
problem can be cast as
Xˆ = argmin
X
ψ(f(X), fprist), s.t. φ(X,X0) < T (2)
where φ(·, ·) and ψ(·, ·) are image and feature space distances,
and T a suitable threshold on distortion.
In [14] an iterative algorithm is proposed, where the ob-
jective function is minimized through local changes on the
image, like in the iterated conditional modes method. This
approach is effective but quite slow, because the feature must
be recomputed at each new step, due to its complex nonlinear
relationship with the image.
Note that, if the classifier is perfectly known, one can target
f close, the feature closest to f0 across the decision boundary,
rather than fprist, as shown in Fig.2(right). This speeds up
convergence considerably, but reduces robustness with respect
to off-target detectors, as also depicted in Fig.2(right).
B. Attacking CNNs by adversarial noise
Experiments in computer vision [16], [20] have clearly
established the vulnerability of CNN-based detectors to ad-
versarial attacks. A suitable adversarial noise pattern can be
added to the input image to mislead the classifier, see Fig.1,
without impairing its visual quality. With CNNs, some simple
algorithms for the generation of adversarial noise are available.
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), proposed in [16],
exploits the differentiability of the loss function. The gradient
of the loss with respect to each pixel of the input image is first
computed by backpropagation. Then, each pixel is modified
by a small quantity, ±, taking the sign of the local gradient.
Neglecting higher order effects, all perturbations increase the
loss, and hence a large change in output can be obtained with
very low-variance adversarial noise.
Following this early, and simple, method, more sophisticated
solutions have been proposed. DeepFool [21] is based on
a local linearization of the classifier under attack, which
allows one to project the input image on the approximate
decision boundary, and to introduce the minimum perturbation
necessary to cross it. The Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
(JSMA) [20] relies on a greedy iterative procedure. Unlike
FGSM, it attacks only the pixels that contribute most to
the correct classification, identified by a suitable saliency
map. In [22], adversarial noise generation is formulated as
a min-max optimization, with the double aim of generating
effective adversarial examples and training robust classifiers.
The resulting algorithm, projected gradient descent (PGD),
provides the optimum adversarial examples when the network
is perfectly known. Noteworthy, FGSM can be regarded as a
single-step scheme to solve the maximization step of PGD.
In the experiments, we will consider only the FGSM al-
gorithm, because of its low complexity (JSMA and PGD are
orders of magnitude slower) and easy interpretation. Note that,
in a realistic setting, images must be rounded to integer values
to be stored or transmitted, so, unlike in theoretical analyses,
we consider only integer values for the  parameter.
C. Attacks based on GANs
Starting from the 2015 seminal work of Goodfellow et al.
[16] generative adversarial networks have gained a major role
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE OF SEVERAL DETECTORS IN THE PRESENCE OF COMMON MANIPULATIONS. TOP: EASY CASES. BOTTOM: CHALLENGING CASES.
SPAM Bayar2016 Cozzolino2017 Xception
Manipulation/parameter FPR TPR ACC FPR TPR ACC FPR TPR ACC FPR TPR ACC
Blurring, σ=1.10 0.06 100.00 99.97 0.02 99.98 99.98 0.07 100.00 99.96 2.26 99.87 98.81
JPEG compression, Q=70 0.02 100.00 99.99 0.83 99.69 99.43 0.00 99.98 99.99 0.63 98.54 98.95
Median filtering, 7×7 0.54 99.90 99.68 0.56 99.93 99.69 1.26 100.00 99.37 0.85 99.96 99.56
Resizing, scale=1.500 0.26 100.00 99.87 0.50 99.94 99.72 0.00 99.96 99.98 6.56 99.11 96.28
Blurring, σ=0.50 24.02 99.12 87.55 8.74 97.93 94.59 7.69 99.06 95.69 13.76 88.06 87.15
JPEG compression, Q=90 6.46 88.26 90.90 0.72 90.17 79.72 5.83 94.81 94.49 2.93 90.37 93.72
Median filtering, 3×3 0.06 99.80 99.87 0.31 99.91 99.80 0.43 99.91 99.74 7.46 99.54 96.04
Resizing, scale=1.010 9.07 99.29 95.11 2.72 99.59 98.44 3.00 99.67 98.33 8.26 98.22 94.98
TABLE II
TPR WITH ADVERSARIAL NOISE (FGSM,  = 1). TARGET: BAYAR2016.
Manipulation SPAM Bayar2016 Cozz.2017 Xception
Blurring 1.10 0.19 0.00 0.00 3.51
JPEG 70 0.06 0.00 0.08 10.22
Median 7×7 99.16 0.00 99.96 26.56
Resizing 1.50 0.02 0.00 0.00 3.28
Blurring 0.50 1.43 0.00 7.67 12.17
JPEG 90 0.26 0.02 0.13 18.01
Median 3×3 86.65 0.00 45.43 10.49
Resizing 1.01 0.95 0.00 5.92 10.18
TABLE III
TPR WITH ADVERSARIAL NOISE (FGSM,  = 1). TARGET: COZZ.2017.
Manipulation SPAM Bayar2016 Cozz.2017 Xception
Blurring 1.10 32.63 32.68 32.19 32.75
JPEG 70 0.20 13.51 0.00 17.16
Median 7×7 98.78 93.34 88.20 96.71
Resizing 1.50 18.76 18.92 18.91 18.58
Blurring 0.50 1.05 1.66 15.67 4.90
JPEG 90 0.02 27.94 0.00 16.42
Median 3×3 92.29 99.95 6.43 35.22
Resizing 1.01 0.71 4.49 13.89 9.02
TABLE IV
TPR WITH ADVERSARIAL NOISE (FGSM,  = 1). TARGET: XCEPTION.
Manipulation SPAM Bayar2016 Cozz.2017 Xception
Blurring 1.10 8.33 12.50 0.63 0.00
JPEG 70 3.00 38.85 0.81 0.41
Median 7×7 99.30 24.74 100.00 0.00
Resizing 1.50 11.56 13.22 1.06 0.00
Blurring 0.50 26.31 30.41 17.20 0.00
JPEG 90 2.24 33.46 0.33 17.98
Median 3×3 99.83 43.93 100.00 7.50
Resizing 1.01 14.24 27.91 8.70 0.00
in deep learning, providing remarkable results in a large num-
ber of tasks involving image synthesis and/or manipulation.
The basic idea is to train in parallel two competing nets,
a generator, which tries to synthesize images with a natural
appearance, and a discriminator, which tries to tell apart
natural from synthetic images. This competition gradually
improves the performance of both nets. Ideally, at convergence,
the generator should be able to produce images that are
indistinguishable from natural ones.
Recently, a GAN-based method has been proposed [17] for
the restoration of median filtered images. For this application,
the generator does not start from a random noise vector to
synthesize the output, as usual with GANs, but takes in input
the manipulated image and restores its natural features. Ac-
cordingly, the generator loss includes not only an adversarial
term, which measures its ability to fool the detector, but also
two image quality terms. These measure objective quality
(distance from the original) and perceptual quality of the
generated image. We refer the reader to the original paper for
all details of the method, underlining only that the generator
relies heavily on residual connections to improve stability and
speed up convergence.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
To carry out our experimental analysis we generate a dataset
taking 200 images from each of 9 different devices, and 192
partially overlapping 128× 128 patches from each image. We
consider 4 types of image manipulation: Gaussian blurring,
JPEG compression, median filtering, and resizing, with two
different settings for each case corresponding to “easy” and
“challenging” tasks. For example, a Gaussian filter with σ =
1.10 causes easily detectable blurring, unlike with σ = 0.50. In
each binary classification task, patches from 6 devices chosen
at random are used for training, the others for testing. Overall,
each training set comprises more than 200k+200k patches, still
relatively small for deep learning applications.
In Tab.I we report, for the considered detectors, false
positive rate (FPR), true positive rate (TPR), and overall
accuracy (ACC), in the absence of counter-forensic attacks.
For easy cases (top), accuracies are always close to 100%, only
Xception shows a somewhat worse performance, very likely
due to the limited training set. For more challenging manip-
ulations (bottom), larger differences are observed, with some
poorer results on JPEG compression (Bayar2016, SPAM) and
TABLE V
TPR FOR MEDIAN FILTERING AFTER GAN-BASED RESTORATION. TOP:
KIM2018 DISCRIMINATOR. BOTTOM VGG DISCRIMINATOR.
Manipulation SPAM Bayar2016 Cozz.2017 Xception
M-7×7 (Kim) 70.44 97.78 89.39 89.19
M-3×3 (Kim) 19.30 49.20 15.69 91.70
M-7×7 (VGG) 3.74 49.15 18.48 35.56
M-3×3 (VGG) 1.17 0.74 0.78 23.76
Gaussian blurring (SPAM, Xception). Nonetheless, a very
good detection performance is still observed, in general.
In Tables II through IV we study the case in which
adversarial noise is added to the manipulated images, using
FGSM with  = 1, namely, the weakest adversarial noise
which survives the image rounding. Since neither the pristine
images nor the detectors change, we report only the TPR for
the attacked manipulated images. Note also that the PSNR is
always 48.13 dB (MSE=1), hence no visual impairment can
be appreciated. The attack is very effective when the same
net is used to generate the adversarial noise and to detect
the manipulation (boldface entries). Only Cozzolino2017, and
only for the 7×7 median filtering, keeps providing a good
TPR. In the absence of alignment, however, the attack is much
less effective, especially for median filtering, both 3×3 and
7×7, for which both SPAM and Cozzolino2017 provide a
TPR close to 100%. These results suggest that, at least in
such cases, the adversarial noise is not restoring the features
of pristine images disrupted by the manipulation, but only
exploiting some detector weaknesses.
This latter consideration further motivates us to explore
the GAN-based attack, which has the very goal of restoring
manipulated images. In Tab.V we report results only for the
critical median filtering cases. They seem to confirm a better
ability of the GAN-based method to attack uniformly all
detectors. Actually, the original architecture proposed in [17]
works well only in the 3×3 case, and never fools Xception.
However, if we replace the original discriminator with a VGG
net [23], the attack becomes more effective for all detectors,
and none of them reaches a 50% TPR.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented an investigation on adversarial attacks
to CNN-based image manipulation detectors. Even a rather
simple attack can completely mislead the target detector and
largely reduce the detection performance of off-target detec-
tors. As only exception, the adversarial noise attack was not
able to conceal 7×7 median filtering, which deeply modifies
the image fine structures. However, a suitable GAN-based
attack proves to work well even in this challenging case.
Obviously, these early results represent only a proof of
concept, and more thorough analyses are necessary to gather a
solid understanding of the relevant issues. More sophisticated
attacks must be considered, and more detectors tested, on a
wider range of manipulations. In particular, realistic applica-
tions over social networks, involving resizing and compres-
sion, should be considered.
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